R.K. Yadav & Anr. v. Union of India and Others, W.P.(C) No. 193 of 2012, 2026 INSC 848 (12 August 2026)
What the case was about
This case examined whether the Union of India could lawfully deny 6th Central Pay Commission scales to Presiding Officers of Central Government Industrial Tribunals-cum-Labour Courts (CGIT-cum-LCs) and instead fix their pay by reference to District Judiciary scales. The petitioners, appointed as Presiding Officers of CGIT-cum-LCs at New Delhi and Hyderabad (para 3), approached the Supreme Court directly under Article 32 of the Constitution. They sought a mandamus directing the government to extend the 6th Pay Commission scales to them and a certiorari to quash the decision linking their salary to the recommendations of the Justice E. Padmanabhan Committee. Their central argument was that CGIT-cum-LCs were Union tribunals falling under Articles 247 and 323-B of the Constitution, placing them on the same constitutional pedestal as the Central Administrative Tribunal, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, and other Central forums that had received the 6th Pay Commission benefits. By contrast, the Union grouped them with the State District Judiciary. They contended this amounted to unconstitutional discrimination under Articles 14 and 16. The dispute called upon the Court to balance the petitioners’ claim to parity against the executive’s longstanding practice of aligning these industrial tribunal officers with the District Judiciary.
The key facts
The petitioners initially joined on deputation and were later re-employed after retirement. While other Central tribunals received the 6th Pay Commission scales, the Union fixed the petitioners’ pay by equating their posts with the District Judiciary on the basis of the Justice E. Padmanabhan Committee’s recommendations. The petitioners contended that this amounted to arbitrary discrimination and violated their fundamental right to equality.
The Union resisted the plea by highlighting that the petitioners were re-employed pensioners. It argued that their pay fixation was governed by a distinct statutory regime—the Central Civil Services (Fixation of Pay of Re-employed Pensioners) Orders, 1986—which applies a special formula for those re-employed after superannuation and expressly withholds pay protection or parity with regular government servants. The government also pointed out that the alignment of CGIT-cum-LC Presiding Officers with the District Judiciary flowed from earlier expert recommendations, including those of the Shetty Commission, and was not an ad hoc bureaucratic choice. The Union maintained that no anomaly or mala fide had been shown to warrant judicial interference.
The questions before the Court
The petition raised three principal questions:
- Whether denying 6th Pay Commission scales to re-employed Presiding Officers of CGIT-cum-LCs and applying District Judiciary-linked scales violates Articles 14 and 16.
- Whether re-employed pensioners constitute a distinct class for pay fixation, permitting the government to deny them parity with regularly employed Central tribunal officers.
- Whether the Union arbitrarily equated CGIT-cum-LCs with the State District Judiciary rather than with comparable Central tribunals such as the Central Administrative Tribunal or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
What the Court decided and why
A Bench of Justices S.V.N. Bhatti and N.V. Anjaria dismissed the writ petition, holding that the government’s classification was rational and constitutionally valid (para 7).
The Court began by reaffirming that pay fixation is fundamentally an executive function. Citing precedent, it observed that courts are not suited to evaluate and compare the justifiability of pay-scale differentiations on the basis of affidavits and pleadings, and that such matters are best left to the executive (para 5.6). The Court added that unless mala fides are shown, the Court would respect the fixation of pay scales by expert bodies (para 5.6), and that judicial review is not altogether excluded but may be exercised only where an apparent anomaly exists (para 5.6.1).
On the equality challenge, the Court affirmed that Article 14 prohibits class legislation but permits reasonable classification. The classification brought out in the instant case, it noted, was based on rational and intelligible differentia that distinguished the persons grouped together from those left out (para 6). Applying this principle, the Court accepted the Union’s contention that re-employed pensioners occupy a materially different position from regular officers in government service. It held that persons re-employed after retirement stand belong to a separate class, and their claim to the 6th Pay Commission scales has no basis to assert on the footing of Fundamental Rights (para 6.7). Grouping them separately from regular employees and equating their pay with the District Judiciary cannot be said to offend either Article 14 or Article 16 (para 6.7).
The Court also rejected the argument that equating CGIT-cum-LCs with the District Judiciary was arbitrary. It noted that industrial tribunals and labour courts are established within the States, and that equating their Presiding Officers with the District Judiciary—excepting the National Tribunals functioning at Mumbai and Calcutta—is reasonable and “does not book any arbitrariness” (para 6.3).
Why it matters
The judgment carries considerable significance for the structure of public employment and judicial review. First, it restates the narrow scope of judicial scrutiny in matters of pay fixation, underscoring that courts will not second-guess the executive or expert pay commissions unless mala fides are shown, and that judicial review is available only where an apparent anomaly exists (paras 5.6, 5.6.1). This reinforces the institutional boundary between the judiciary and the political branches in economic governance, reminding litigants that pay parity claims are rarely justiciable.
Second, the ruling clarifies that re-employment after retirement creates a distinct constitutional class. Re-employed pensioners cannot claim automatic parity with regular government employees merely because they discharge analogous functions; the fact of superannuation and the special statutory regime governing re-employment provide a rational basis for differential treatment (para 6.7). This has implications for other cadres of retired officers who return to government service.
Third, by upholding the alignment of CGIT-cum-LC Presiding Officers with the District Judiciary, the Court provided constitutional sanction to a long-standing executive practice grounded in multiple expert committee recommendations. This brings consistency and predictability to the pay structure of industrial tribunal officers across the country and settles a debate that has affected the cadre for years (para 6.3).