Vijay Kumar Rajpoot alias Vijju v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. — 2026 INSC 926 (31 August 2026)
What the case was about
This case tested the limits of the state’s power to extern — forcibly remove — a person from his home district under the Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990. The appellant challenged an order that barred him from Raigarh and neighbouring districts for a year. The catch was that the order was passed without giving him any notice or hearing while he was already in judicial custody. The Supreme Court therefore had to decide whether such an ex parte externment was valid, whether the District Magistrate could reopen a closed case to pass it, and whether the High Court could simply refuse to hear his plea and direct him to a statutory appeal instead. (para 1, 17)
The key facts
In 2019, the Superintendent of Police, Raigarh, recommended the appellant’s externment based on ten old criminal cases. The District Magistrate initiated proceedings, but by an order dated 6 October 2025 he closed the case and let the appellant off with a warning. (para 3, 4)
Two fresh FIRs were registered thereafter. Crime No. 117/2023 was subsequently quashed. Crime No. 483/2025 concerned allegations that the appellant had circulated an abusive video targeting Baba Guru Ghasidas, a revered figure of the Satnami community. While the appellant was in judicial custody in connection with this second FIR, the Superintendent submitted a fresh report on 3 November 2025. The very next day, the District Magistrate recalled the closure order and passed an ex parte externment order directing the appellant to remove himself from Raigarh and contiguous districts for one year, citing public outrage and the need to maintain law and order. (para 5, 6)
The appellant moved the High Court of Chhattisgarh in a writ petition, but on 22 January 2026 the High Court dismissed it and relegated him to the alternative remedy of appeal under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam. He then approached the Supreme Court. (para 1, 2)
The questions before the Court
The Court framed four issues for determination:
- Whether the ex parte externment order violated the mandatory requirement of notice and hearing under Section 8 of the Adhiniyam.
- Whether the District Magistrate had jurisdiction to suo motu recall or reopen the closure order dated 6 October 2025.
- Whether the High Court was justified in refusing to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and relegating the appellant to the statutory appeal under Section 9.
- Whether the externment order was legally sustainable on the merits under Section 5(a) and/or Section 5(b) of the Adhiniyam. (para 17)
What the Court decided and why
The Court allowed the appeal and quashed both the High Court judgment and the externment order, declaring the appellant free to enter the districts from which he had been barred. (para 36, 37)
Mandatory hearing under Section 8.
The Court held that Section 8(1) of the Adhiniyam makes notice and a reasonable opportunity of hearing “conditions precedent” before any externment order under Sections 3 to 6 can be passed. “It necessarily follows that an order passed in derogation of these mandatory requirements would stand vitiated and liable to be declared void ab initio.” (para 19) The statute permits an ex parte proceeding only under the limited exception in Section 8(5), which applies when a person fails to execute a security bond or fails to appear during the inquiry. The Court found these conditions were “admittedly absent.” (para 21, 22) Citing Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, it reaffirmed that where a statute mandates a hearing before restricting a fundamental right, failure to comply renders the order void from its very inception. (para 23)
No inherent power to reopen a closed case.
The Court also ruled that the District Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to recall his earlier closure order. “It is settled law that an administrative authority enjoys no power to review his earlier order, unless the statute empowers him to do so.” (para 25) Because the Adhiniyam contains no express provision allowing the District Magistrate to reopen a closed externment case, the recall was without legal authority.
High Court’s failure to exercise jurisdiction.
The Court held that the High Court “grossly erred” in not entertaining the writ petition. When an order is ex facie vitiated by want of jurisdiction and breach of natural justice, relegation to an alternative statutory remedy is impermissible. (para 26, 27)
The order was unsustainable on merits.
Even on merits, the externment order could not survive. Section 5(b) can be invoked only where there exist reasonable grounds for believing that a person is engaged in offences involving force or violence, or certain specified categories of offences. “Admittedly, none of the offences of which the appellant is accused and which have been relied on by the third respondent in the impugned externment order are offences involving force or violence.” (para 30)
As for Section 5(a), the Court observed that externment “directly impinges upon valuable fundamental freedoms” and “cannot be made as a matter of routine or on mere ipse dixit.” (para 31) The District Magistrate must arrive at a bona fide subjective satisfaction based on objective material, and the order must disclose a discernible nexus between the material and the conclusion. Here, apart from recording public resentment, the order indicated no material or reasons justifying such an extreme measure. (para 32) Relying on Deepak v. State of Maharashtra, the Court concluded that the order showed non-application of mind and smacked of arbitrariness. (para 33)
Why it matters
The judgment reinforces that preventive executive action cannot override elementary procedural safeguards. By holding that notice and a meaningful hearing are mandatory prerequisites, the Court has underlined that the audi alteram partem rule lies at the heart of externment proceedings, which strip a citizen of the fundamental right to move freely and reside in his own home. (para 19, 33)
It also clarifies that administrative authorities possess no hidden “inherent power” to revisit final orders unless the legislature has expressly given them that key. (para 25)
Finally, the decision reminds High Courts that the existence of a statutory appeal is not an automatic excuse to look away. When an order is stillborn because of jurisdictional defect and denial of natural justice, directing the aggrieved person to an appellate forum is an abdication of constitutional duty under Article 226. (para 26, 27)
The Court added that none of its observations would be treated as findings on the merits of the pending criminal cases against the appellant. (para 38)