2026 INSC 740 | July 24, 2026
What the case was about
The Supreme Court of India was asked to use its direct constitutional powers to either quash or consolidate multiple First Information Reports (FIRs) registered across three States. The petitioner, Rutvij Bhagat Singh Wakhare, filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking quashing of FIRs lodged in Karnataka, Maharashtra and Odisha, which alleged that his proprietary concern’s bank account had received proceeds from a cyber-fraud racket. In the alternative, he wanted the FIRs clubbed and investigated together by one agency to avoid conflicting probes. The case gave the Court an opportunity to clarify when it will bypass the High Court to quash criminal proceedings, and when multiple FIRs spread across jurisdictions can be treated as one “same transaction.”
The key facts
The allegations in the FIRs relate to a cyber-fraud scheme in which complainants were contacted by unknown persons posing as police officials and were induced to transfer large sums of money to various bank accounts (para 3). It is alleged that a part of these funds was credited to an account maintained in the name of the petitioner’s proprietary concern, M/s Al Zeba Marinen Overseas (para 3).
The petitioner denied any role in the offences. He claimed he had permitted his friend, Ganesh Khaire, to use the account for an online gaming business, and contended that Khaire and Krishnakant Sharma had misused it. The petitioner further stated that upon learning of the misuse, he himself lodged a cyber-crime complaint against the two men on 9 May 2024 (para 4).
The questions before the Court
The bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih had to answer three main questions:
- Can a person directly approach the Supreme Court under Article 32 to quash FIRs, or must they ordinarily go to the High Court first?
- On the facts presented, should the Court quash these FIRs?
- Can FIRs registered in different States—involving different victims, amounts and dates but a similar modus operandi and a common recipient account—be clubbed into one composite investigation?
What the Court decided and why
Article 32: Available, but not a shortcut
The Court reaffirmed that the right to approach the Supreme Court under Article 32 is itself a fundamental right (para 7), and that this Court’s power under Article 32 is broad enough to quash criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process (para 8). The existence of an alternative statutory remedy does not, by itself, bar the exercise of this jurisdiction (para 8). However, the Court stressed that this is an “extraordinary remedy” which must be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances, particularly when it is necessary to secure the ends of justice or prevent infringement of fundamental rights (para 7).
As a matter of judicial discipline and orderly procedure, an aggrieved party is expected to first approach the High Court under Article 226 or Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (para 8). The Court drew a clear distinction between whether a petition is “maintainable” and whether it “should be entertained.” It observed that when the High Court possesses equally efficacious powers under Section 482 CrPC, “there is no reason to by-pass the procedure under the CrPC” unless exceptional grounds exist (para 9.1).
Applying this, the Court held that the petitioner had failed to establish infringement of any fundamental right or any exceptional or exigent circumstances that would justify bypassing the ordinary procedure (para 10). Accordingly, it declined to quash the FIRs directly and indicated that the petitioner should pursue available remedies before the High Court.
No clubbing: the “test of sameness” fails
On the alternative prayer for clubbing, the Court surveyed the well-settled law that there can be no second FIR—and no fresh investigation—for the “same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences” (para 14.1). However, subsequent FIRs are permissible where they relate to distinct occurrences or offences, or reveal a larger conspiracy (para 14).
To determine whether separate acts form part of the “same transaction,” the Court applied the “test of sameness.” This involves three factors, though not to be applied cumulatively: unity of purpose and design; proximity of time and place; and continuity of action (para 15).
In this case, each FIR was lodged by a different complainant who was allegedly induced to part with money on different occasions. The Court observed that there was “no live link or connectivity of transactions inter se different set of persons.” The mere fact that part of the defrauded amounts was allegedly transferred into the petitioner’s proprietary account did not, by itself, establish that all the incidents formed part of the same transaction (para 16). Though the modus operandi appeared similar, the victims, amounts, transactions and consequences were distinct.
The Court also pointed out that clubbing the FIRs may cause hardship to the complainants, who would be forced to run from pillar to post to pursue their criminal complaints (para 17). It further noted that the investigation was at a nascent stage. Cyber frauds often involve complex technological means, multiple accounts and cross-jurisdictional money trails, and a direction for composite investigation at this stage could impede a fair and effective investigation (para 18).
Final order
The writ petition was dismissed. The Court expressly reserved liberty for the petitioner to approach the appropriate forum—such as the High Court under Article 226 or Section 482 CrPC—to seek quashing or other relief, and left all contentions open to be decided on merits by the competent court (para 19).
Why it matters
This judgment is a significant reminder that the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Article 32 is not a routine substitute for the High Court’s statutory and writ powers in criminal matters. Parties seeking to quash FIRs must generally first approach the High Court unless they can demonstrate a clear fundamental-right violation or exceptional circumstances that demand the apex court’s immediate intervention.
Equally important is the Court’s application of the “test of sameness” to cyber offences. It clarifies that a shared modus operandi or a common bank account used to park fraud proceeds does not automatically make separate deceptions against different victims part of the “same transaction.” For investigators and trial courts handling multi-jurisdictional cybercrime, the ruling underscores that distinct offences should ordinarily be investigated separately, especially at an early stage, to preserve the integrity of evidence and protect the rights of individual complainants. The Court also cautioned that these frauds often target vulnerable victims, reinforcing that their gravity should not be diluted by procedural shortcuts.