2026 INSC 778 | 31 July 2026
What the case was about
The appeal raised a straightforward but consequential question about maintenance law: if a husband alleges that his wife is living in adultery, can he block her claim for interim maintenance at the outset, or must that question wait until the very end of the case? The dispute arose under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which empowers a magistrate to order monthly support for a wife unable to maintain herself. Section 125(4) creates an exception by disqualifying a wife who is “living in adultery.” The Supreme Court had to decide whether this exception operates as a preliminary shield against interim relief, or whether it can be examined only at the stage of final adjudication (para 2).
The key facts
Himanshu Chordia married Arushi Jain in July 2014. After marital discord, she left the matrimonial home in May 2020 and filed an application for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC in November 2020. The appellant husband responded by filing an application under Section 125(4) CrPC, contending that she was living in adultery and was therefore barred from receiving any maintenance. He relied on photographs and electronic evidence to support his plea. The Special Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Udaipur, dismissed his applications under Section 125(4) and Section 91 CrPC by order dated 27 June 2024; interim maintenance was granted to the respondent-wife. Chordia then filed a quashing petition before the Rajasthan High Court, which dismissed it on 4 February 2025, holding that the adultery issue could only be decided at the final stage. He approached the Supreme Court by Special Leave Petition.
The questions before the Court
The Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Vipul M. Pancholi framed three questions:
- Can an application under Section 125(4) CrPC alleging that the wife is living in adultery be decided as a preliminary issue to deny interim maintenance, or must it be adjudicated only at the final disposal of the Section 125 proceedings?
- What is the nature and standard of proof required to establish the disqualification under Section 125(4) CrPC at the interim stage?
- Does the mere pendency of a Section 125(4) application automatically bar the award or continuation of interim maintenance under the second proviso to Section 125(1) CrPC?
What the Court decided and why
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s judgment, and remanded the matter to the Trial Court to decide the Section 125(4) application on its merits (para 24).
The statutory bar covers interim as well as final maintenance
The Court began with the plain language of the statute. Section 125(4) states that no wife shall be entitled to receive an “allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance” if she is living in adultery. The text itself, read with Section 125(5), makes plain that if adultery is established, the wife is not entitled to maintenance “as an interim measure and therefore, obviously, not even as a final measure” (para 9).
The application must be decided on merits, not deferred
Because the statutory bar applies to interim relief, an application under Section 125(4) cannot be mechanically relegated to the final stage. The Trial Court ought to have decided the application on its own merits rather than dismissing it at the threshold. The High Court’s view that the issue could only be decided at final adjudication was legally unsustainable (para 20). The correct sequence, the Court held, is that once basic facts are established, interim maintenance may be ordered, and it continues to operate until the Section 125(4) application is conclusively decided (para 20).
Mere pendency does not stop interim maintenance
The Court made it equally clear that simply filing an application under Section 125(4) does not, by itself, freeze or bar the payment of interim maintenance. The second proviso to Section 125(1) is designed to ensure that support reaches the applicant expeditiously. If interim maintenance were suspended merely because a disqualification plea was filed, the payment would be “perpetually contingent” on a potentially lengthy adjudication, undermining the beneficent purpose of the provision (para 11). Accordingly, interim maintenance ordinarily continues until the Section 125(4) plea is conclusively decided against the claimant (para 11).
Standard of proof required at the interim stage
To actually cut off interim maintenance at an early stage, the party invoking Section 125(4) must present “clear and cogent evidence that would ex-facie establish adultery” on the part of the claimant (para 14). If such strong, face-value proof is absent, the interim order remains in force while the court examines the merits of the disqualification plea (para 14).
Remand
Because the Trial Court dismissed the husband’s application on the threshold without adjudicating the evidence, and the High Court wrongly endorsed that approach, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order dated 4 February 2025 and remanded the Section 125(4) application to the Trial Court for a decision on merits (para 24).
Why it matters
The judgment provides a clear procedural roadmap for handling adultery claims in maintenance proceedings. It prevents trial courts from deferring Section 125(4) pleas indefinitely to the final stage, ensuring that a genuine statutory bar is given effect when raised. At the same time, it guards against the provision being used as a dilatory tactic: interim maintenance does not halt automatically upon the filing of such a plea, and the party seeking to deny it must produce clear and cogent evidence that ex facie establishes the disqualifying conduct. For litigants and magistrates, the ruling establishes that interim support continues while the claim is tested, and it can be withdrawn only if the court is satisfied, on the basis of strong initial proof, that the wife is living in adultery.