S. Panchalingu & Ors. v. People’s Education Trust (R) & Ors. etc. | 2026 INSC 1010 | 18 September 2026
What the case was about
Suing a public charitable or religious trust in India requires clearing a statutory hurdle first. Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, mandates that before two or more interested persons can institute a suit alleging breach of trust or mismanagement, they must obtain the court’s formal leave. Parliament designed this requirement to serve as both a “protective shield” for the trust against vexatious litigation and a “remedial sword” for genuine beneficiaries acting in the public interest (para 34).
Despite this framework, a deep procedural split had emerged across High Courts. Allahabad, Bombay, Kerala and Madras had held that civil courts retained protective jurisdiction to pass interim orders—including appointing receivers—while a leave application under Section 92 was pending. Karnataka and Orissa had taken the contrary view, treating the proposed suit as “stillborn” until leave was granted, thereby denying interim relief. The Supreme Court was called upon to resolve this conflict and clarify the precise limits of judicial power at the threshold stage (paras 2–3).
The key facts
The dispute concerned the People’s Education Trust, a public charitable institution. The appellants filed a plaint under Section 92 of the CPC along with an application seeking leave to institute the suit. While the leave application was still pending, the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mandya, appointed an ad hoc committee comprising existing trustees to manage the Trust’s day-to-day affairs under Order XL Rule 1(a) of the CPC. The trial court apparently intended to preserve trust property and ensure administrative continuity during the interregnum.
The respondents challenged this order before the Karnataka High Court. By its judgment dated 25 June 2025, the High Court set aside the trial court’s order, holding that a suit under Section 92 is “stillborn” without leave and that no interim or protective orders could be lawfully passed before the threshold question of leave was resolved. The appellants then appealed to the Supreme Court (para 4).
The questions before the Court
The Court framed two precise questions. First, does a civil court that receives a Section 92 plaint together with a leave application have the power to pass protective or preservatory interim orders during the pendency of the leave application? Second, can the court invoke Order XL Rule 1 read with Section 94 to appoint a receiver, or exercise inherent powers under Section 151, before leave has actually been granted? (para 2)
What the Court decided and why
A Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Manmohan dismissed the appeals and affirmed the Karnataka High Court’s view, while adding a limited clarification for urgent cases.
No underlying suit until leave is granted. The Court held that an application for leave under Section 92 is a “threshold proceeding,” not the suit itself (para 35). Until leave is granted, the plaint does not mature into an instituted suit, and no “lis” exists before the court (para 39). Without an underlying proceeding, the court cannot invoke “supplemental proceedings” under Section 94 or Order XL Rule 1, because such powers necessarily presuppose a pending suit (para 39).
Section 141 and inherent powers cannot override the special statute. The appellants argued that Section 141 makes the Code’s general procedure applicable to miscellaneous proceedings, allowing interim relief at the leave stage. The Court disagreed, holding that Section 141 extends only to procedural rights and cannot alter the substantive safeguards vested in public trusts under Section 92 (paras 42, 47). Similarly, the Court ruled that the general inherent power under Section 151 cannot be used to bypass the express, special requirement of Section 92. Applying the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant—that general provisions do not derogate from special ones—the Court held that the safeguards embedded in Section 92 must be complied with before any interlocutory orders are entertained (para 49).
Receiver appointment is intrusive. The Court rejected the argument that appointing a receiver is merely neutral or preservatory. In the context of a public trust, such an appointment effectively displaces existing management and would cause precisely the disruption that the leave requirement is meant to prevent. If leave were ultimately refused, the trust would already have suffered the very prejudice the statutory filter seeks to avoid (para 54).
The proper route for urgency. The Court recognised that trust assets may face imminent peril. It clarified that for compelling reasons, such as where facts disclose the necessity of urgent relief, notice prior to the grant of leave may be dispensed with (para 60). In such exceptional cases, leave may be granted ex parte, subject to the defendants’ right to seek revocation (holding 7). This ensures the statutory gatekeeper function remains intact while allowing genuine claimants to obtain permission to sue without waiting for full notice.
Why it matters
The judgment resolves a long-standing divergence of judicial opinion and establishes a uniform national rule: courts cannot seize the management of a public charitable trust or issue protective interim orders before they have even permitted the suit to exist. This reinforces Section 92’s role as a robust bulwark against harassment of charitable institutions through premature or speculative litigation, ensuring that trust resources are not diverted into defending interlocutory battles over management control before a court has ruled on maintainability.
At the same time, the ruling is not rigid. By clarifying that courts may grant ex parte leave when facts disclose genuine urgency, the Court offers litigants a lawful avenue to secure swift judicial oversight without bypassing the statutory threshold. For trustees and donors of public charities, the decision provides welcome procedural certainty; for potential plaintiffs, it underscores that the first step must always be to secure permission to sue, and that urgency must be demonstrated to the court that grants it, not to a receiver appointed before the suit exists.