Shruti Manav Sharma & Anr. v. Sunanina Singh & Ors. — 2026 INSC 843 — 12 August 2026
What the case was about
This appeal from the Delhi High Court gave the Supreme Court an occasion to draw a bright line around temporary injunctions. At its core, the case asked whether a Division Bench, hearing an appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, could legitimately scrap a Single Judge’s interim freeze on a family’s companies and properties simply because it disagreed with the outcome. The Court answered with a firm no. The ruling is a sharp reminder that an interim injunction is only a “holding operation,” not a preview of the final trial, and that an appellate court may not substitute its own discretion for that of the trial judge (para 2; para 20; para 36).
The key facts
Shri Devinder Singh Chaudhary died in 2009, leaving an estate held through family companies, limited liability partnerships, and trusts (para 4). His widow, Sita Chaudhary, claimed he left a Will dated 26 March 2004. One of their sons contended that a later Will dated 4 October 2008 applied; another argued the testator died intestate (para 4).
Between December 2018 and June 2019, while residing with Sita Chaudhary, her granddaughter Sunanina Singh (defendant No. 4) and Sunanina’s husband Ajay Kadyan (defendant No. 9) procured gift deeds and LLP transfer agreements that moved shares and partnership capital in family entities into their own names (para 5). They also sold a farmhouse, obtained large loans, and used the proceeds to acquire immovable properties and luxury assets (para 6).
Sita Chaudhary filed CS(OS) No. 589 of 2021 alleging undue influence and fraud, and sought a declaration that the transfers were void, restoration of shareholding, and an interim injunction. On 29 July 2022, the learned Single Judge granted the injunction (para 11). The defendants appealed, and on 20 March 2026 a Division Bench set it aside (para 13). The original plaintiff died on 9 January 2025, and her legal representatives were substituted to carry on the fight (para 12).
The questions before the Court
The Supreme Court framed three linked issues. First, did the Division Bench err by substituting its own view for the Single Judge’s discretionary order instead of reviewing it only for arbitrariness or perversity? Second, had the appellants satisfied the three conditions for interim injunction: a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury? Third, did the Division Bench cross the line by conducting an impermissible “mini-trial” on contested questions of title, succession, undue influence, and statutory interpretation at the interlocutory stage? (para 2; para 13)
What the Court decided and why
A bench of Justices Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Alok Aradhe allowed the appeals, set aside the Division Bench’s judgment, and restored the Single Judge’s injunction (para 41).
The Court began with the standard of appellate interference. An order granting temporary injunction is discretionary. An appellate court may set it aside only if the discretion below was exercised “arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely, or in ignorance of the settled principles” governing such relief. It may not reverse the order merely because it would have reached a different conclusion on the same material (para 36). The Single Judge’s order—anchored in findings about the widow’s interest under the Will, the cloud over its finality, the plea of undue influence, and the alter-ego character of the defendant entities—was neither arbitrary nor perverse.
The Court then stressed the very purpose of interlocutory relief: it “decides nothing; it is a holding operation, so that the trial, when it comes, is not a barren exercise” (para 20). Citing Lord Diplock’s caution, consistently accepted in India, the Court observed that the interlocutory stage is not the occasion to resolve conflicts of affidavit evidence or to decide difficult questions of law calling for mature consideration (para 38). Yet the Division Bench had done exactly that. Despite correctly reciting the narrow standard of review, it went on to construe individual clauses of the 2004 Will, weigh admissions from a separate suit, apply Section 89 of the Companies Act, 2013, and demand a “clear prima facie nexus” between specific acquisitions and the proceeds of challenged transfers (para 13; para 27). Each of these matters is reserved for full trial, not for an appellate court on an interlocutory appeal.
Turning to the three conditions, the Court confirmed that the threshold for a prima facie case is modest. It “does not require proof of title; it requires only that the claim not be frivolous or vexatious—a serious question to be tried” (para 24). The Division Bench’s insistence on a higher standard was therefore impermissible.
On balance of convenience, the Court noted that the restraint was narrowly tailored: it blocked further alienation of disputed shareholdings, LLP interests, and immovable properties “whose very provenance is under a cloud,” while expressly permitting an ongoing commercial project to continue (para 30). As for irreparable injury, the loss of controlling shareholding and the creation of third-party rights in traceable properties, once alienated, could not be unwound by any eventual decree or compensated in damages (para 33).
Why it matters
The ruling is a significant procedural checkpoint. It reinforces that appellate courts hearing appeals against interim orders must resist the temptation to hold a “mini-trial.” The Supreme Court wiped the slate clean by effacing the Division Bench’s merits-based observations, ensuring that contested questions of testamentary succession, statutory interpretation, and undue influence will be decided at trial on evidence, uninfluenced by preliminary judicial commentary (para 41).
The judgment also signals to trial courts to keep interim orders concise and confined to the settled triad—prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury—rather than letting them swell into merits-laden treatises. For litigants, the decision affirms that equity will preserve the subject-matter of a suit pending trial, provided the dispute is genuine and the injury would be irretrievable. The direction to decide the suit on evidence preferably within eight months adds a measure of expedition to that safeguard.