Delhi Technological University v. B.S. Rawat, 2026 INSC 797 (Supreme Court of India, 4 August 2026)
What the case was about
The Supreme Court of India was called upon to settle a question that affects thousands of public-sector employees: once you have resigned, accepted the settlement, and even joined a new job, can you change your mind and force your old employer to take you back? In a set of connected appeals involving Delhi Technological University (DTU) and the National Institute of Technology, Calicut (NITC), the Court examined the legal force of a resignation accepted by an officer who lacked formal authority, the effect of subsequent ratification by the competent body, and whether an employee who has already acted on his resignation can later withdraw it.
The key facts
The respondent, B.S. Rawat, was appointed Assistant Registrar (Legal) at DTU in August 2010 (para 2). On 19 May 2016, he tendered his resignation, asking that the notice period be waived and that he be relieved by 31 May 2016 (para 4). The then in-charge Vice-Chancellor—who was holding the post only in additional charge and was not the full-time appointee—accepted the resignation on 25 May 2016 and relieved Rawat on 31 May 2016. Rawat accepted his no-dues certificate, last pay certificate, and an experience certificate, which he later used to secure fresh employment elsewhere (paras 4, 23).
Four months after leaving, on 22 September 2016, Rawat wrote to DTU seeking to withdraw his resignation on the ground that it had never been accepted by the Board of Management (BOM), the body he claimed was the only competent authority under the DTU Act (para 5). The BOM ratified the acceptance at its meeting on 26 September 2016, and his request for withdrawal was rejected on 3 November 2016 (para 5). Rawat challenged the decision before the Delhi High Court, which ultimately ordered his reinstatement, though it denied back wages because he had taken up another post in the interim (para 6). DTU appealed.
In the meantime, Rawat had joined NIT Calicut as Deputy Registrar on 8 February 2017 (para 8). There, too, he resigned—on 8 November 2018—only to seek withdrawal on 28 November 2018 after being selected for a deputation post elsewhere (para 9). The NITC acceptance order dated 22 November 2018 fixed his relieving for 11 January 2019, and the institute refused to let him withdraw the resignation (para 9). While a Single Judge of the Kerala High Court had ordered his reinstatement, the Division Bench set aside that order, prompting Rawat to file Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court (para 10).
The questions before the Court
The Court framed two precise questions for determination (para 15):
- Whether the acceptance of Rawat’s resignation by an in-charge Vice-Chancellor—admittedly not the competent authority under Section 23(2)(ix) of the DTU Act—was validated by the subsequent ratification of the BOM.
- Whether the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court was justified in upholding NITC’s acceptance of his resignation and its refusal to permit withdrawal.
What the Court decided and why
On the first question, the Court held that although the in-charge Vice-Chancellor lacked the authority to accept the resignation, the BOM’s ratification on 26 September 2016 cured that defect completely. Citing the doctrine of ratification, the Court explained that ratification “denotes the confirmation or adoption, by a person or body possessing the requisite authority, of an act earlier done on its behalf without such authority… so that the act is treated as valid from its inception” (para 18). Consequently, the ratification related back to 25 May 2016, the very date the resignation was first accepted, meaning “there was, in point of law, no resignation left in existence which he could have withdrawn on 22.09.2016” (para 25).
Even without ratification, the Court found that the resignation had become a “consummated and irrevocable transaction” (para 20). Rawat had not merely resigned; he had actively sought early relief, accepted all consequential benefits, and used the experience certificate issued by DTU to obtain a new post at NIT Calicut (paras 22–23). Applying the principle against approbation and reprobation, the Court held that an employee who has altered his position on the footing that the resignation is final cannot later impugn the very transaction he brought about merely because of a “technical infirmity” in the mode of acceptance (paras 20, 24). In short, the Court observed, he could not “have his cake and eat it too” (para 24).
The Court therefore allowed DTU’s appeal, set aside the Delhi High Court’s direction for reinstatement, and dismissed Rawat’s writ petition (para 31).
Regarding the NIT Calicut episode, the Court upheld the Kerala High Court’s judgment. It noted that under Statute 30 of the NIT First Statutes, 2009, a resignation “shall take effect only on the date on which the resignation is accepted by the appointing authority” (para 27). The statute did not require communication of acceptance or the expiry of a notice period as a condition for legal efficacy. Since the resignation was accepted on 22 November 2018, it was already effective when Rawat tried to withdraw it on 28 November 2018 (para 27). Furthermore, under the Office Memorandum dated 11 February 1988, the competent authority retains a discretion to refuse withdrawal of an accepted resignation before actual relieving, provided reasons are recorded (para 28). The Court found the authority’s conclusion—that Rawat’s request was motivated by his fresh deputation selection rather than any genuine desire to continue—entirely rational and not open to interference under Article 226 of the Constitution (para 29). The connected Special Leave Petitions were therefore dismissed (para 31).
Why it matters
The judgment offers important guidance on employment law in the public sector. First, it reaffirms that ratification by a competent authority relates back to the date of the original unauthorised act and validates it, so long as the act itself is not inherently illegal (para 18). Second, it underscores that an employee cannot accept the fruits of a resignation—salary dues, clearance certificates, and even a new job obtained with those documents—and then dispute the resignation’s validity when it becomes inconvenient (paras 20, 23). Third, for statutory regimes like that of the NITs, the ruling clarifies that the date of acceptance, not the date of relieving or even formal communication, is the precise moment a resignation takes legal effect (para 27). Finally, the decision reminds public servants that the right to withdraw a resignation is not absolute; where the law confers discretion on the appointing authority, courts will not lightly substitute their own view for that of the employer (para 29).