2026 INSC 755 (28 July 2026)
What the case was about
This appeal arose from a long-running employment dispute between the Mumbai Port Authority and one of its Scheduled Caste employees. After the Port Authority demoted the employee following a 2016 Bombay High Court decision that quashed the 2002 Office Memorandum under which she had been promoted (para 3.3), the National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) intervened and directed the Port Authority to reinstate her promotion and pay her arrears within 30 days (para 4). The Port Authority argued that the NCSC had crossed a constitutional line by acting like a court or tribunal, and that its powers under Article 338 are only recommendatory. The Bombay High Court disagreed and upheld the NCSC order (para 2), prompting the Port Authority to file special leave. The Supreme Court’s ruling also speaks to the limits of analogous constitutional bodies such as the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes and the National Commission for Backward Classes, which operate under similar provisions (para 13).
The key facts
Respondent No. 3, Madhavi K. Chandorkar, an SC employee of the Mumbai Port Authority, was promoted to Stenographer Grade-I under an Office Memorandum dated 21 January 2002 (para 3.2). In 2016, the Bombay High Court quashed that Office Memorandum (para 3.3). The Port Authority accordingly issued a circular in December 2018 and notionally demoted her from Grade I to Grade II with effect from 19 April 2007 to 30 November 2016 (para 3.6). She approached the NCSC, which by order dated 23 October 2024 directed the Port Authority to promote her, pay arrears within 30 days, and submit an action-taken report (para 4). The Port Authority challenged the order in Writ Petition (L) No. 1449 of 2025, but the High Court dismissed the petition (para 2). The Port Authority then filed SLP(C) No. 33359 of 2025; leave was granted and the matter was converted into Civil Appeal No. … of 2026 (para 2).
The questions before the Court
The Supreme Court framed three precise questions for determination: whether the NCSC can pass orders in respect of service matters under Article 338 of the Constitution; whether the NCSC’s orders are adjudicatory and binding, or merely recommendatory and advisory; and whether the NCSC has the power under Article 338(8) to issue mandatory directions such as for payment of arrears within a specified period (para 2).
What the Court decided and why
A bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih allowed the appeal, set aside the Bombay High Court judgment, and declared the NCSC’s direction for payment of arrears to be “contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and as such non-est in law” (para 14).
The Court held that Article 338 does not confer adjudicatory authority on the NCSC. Its duties are confined to investigating and monitoring safeguards for Scheduled Castes, inquiring into specific complaints, advising on planning, presenting reports to the President, and making recommendations to the Union or State governments (para 9). While the NCSC can record factual findings and request the concerned government to act upon them, such a role is “at best recommendatory in nature” and “certainly does not confer adjudicatory power” (para 9).
On Article 338(8), the Court ruled that the civil-court powers enumerated there are strictly procedural aids. They are available only “for the purpose of investigating and inquiring” into matters under Article 338(5)(a) and (b), and for that limited purpose alone (para 11). The word “namely” in Article 338(8), followed by a finite list of powers such as summoning witnesses and requiring documents, indicates a narrow scope (para 9). These powers do not include the ability to grant injunctions, binding mandamus, or substantive relief (para 11).
The Court examined All India Indian Overseas Bank SC and ST Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. Union of India (para 11) to underscore that procedural powers do not convert the Commission into a civil court and that the power to grant injunctions does not inhere in it. It referred to Collector v. Ajit Jogi (para 12) for the proposition that the NCSC’s power to inquire into deprivation of rights does not extend to deciding individual status or directing specific relief. Finally, in paragraph 13 the Court observed that the NCSC and its counterparts under Articles 338A and 338B are constitutional bodies with a socially beneficent purpose, but the legislature has prescribed a role that is “recommendatory and advisory, but certainly not adjudicatory,” noting that such commissions are not tribunals discharging functions of a judicial character—a principle reflected in Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Orissa State Commission for Women.
Why it matters
The judgment establishes a clear constitutional boundary: the NCSC cannot pass binding orders in individual service disputes, and government employers need not treat its directives as enforceable judgments. Directions concerning promotion, reinstatement, or payment of arrears issued by the Commission are advisory recommendations addressed to the Union or State governments rather than executable commands against the employer. This confirms that employees seeking binding remedies will need to approach courts or tribunals with the authority to grant such relief. The ruling also prevents overlap between oversight commissions and the judiciary, ensuring that bodies like the NCSC, NCST, and NCBC retain their vital monitoring and investigative functions without assuming adjudicatory powers that the Constitution does not confer upon them.