Abu Salem Abdul Qayoom Ansari v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2026 INSC 982 (10 September 2026)
Bench: Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta
What the case was about
The Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by a man extradited from Portugal in 2005 who sought immediate release from prison through writs of habeas corpus and mandamus. His core argument was that a sovereign assurance given by India to Portugal—promising that he would not be imprisoned for more than 25 years—meant he had already served the maximum permissible custody once undertrial detention, post-conviction imprisonment and earned remissions were tallied. The Court ruled that the assurance did not convert his two concurrent sentences of life imprisonment into a fixed 25-year term, refused to let him count overlapping periods of custody twice, and held that jail-earned remissions could not be used to accelerate the executive-driven 25-year limit. The judgment sharply delineates where diplomatic commitment ends and judicial punishment begins.
The key facts
The appellant was extradited to India in November 2005 after the Government of India solemnly assured Portugal that he would not be sentenced to death or kept in prison beyond 25 years (para 4.1). Following his arrival, he was tried in two cases under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. In the first case, a TADA Court convicted him on 25 February 2015 and sentenced him to rigorous life imprisonment; in the second, he was convicted on 7 September 2017 and again sentenced to life imprisonment, with the direction that the second sentence run concurrently with the first (paras 4.3–4.4).
On 11 July 2022, the Supreme Court disposed of his appeals. It fixed 12 October 2005 as the date from which his detention would commence, rejected his claim for set-off under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for incarceration undergone in Portugal, and directed that upon completion of 25 years the Central Government must consider advising the President to exercise powers under Article 72 of the Constitution, or itself act under Sections 432 and 433 of the CrPC, to commute or remit the sentences (paras 4.6–4.7).
In 2025 the appellant moved the Bombay High Court claiming he had already completed 25 years. His calculation broke custody into three parts: undertrial detention from 11 November 2005 to 7 September 2017; post-conviction custody from 25 February 2015 to 30 June 2026; and jail-earned remissions totalling three years, six months and two days (paras 3, 10–13). The High Court dismissed his writ petition on 15 April 2026, holding that the 25-year period had not been lawfully completed (para 4.9). He then filed the present appeal under Article 136.
The questions before the Court
The appeal raised three principal issues. First, had the appellant already completed 25 years in custody, particularly given that his method treated overlapping periods under concurrent sentences as separate stretches of undertrial and post-conviction detention? Second, did the sovereign assurance given to Portugal convert his sentences of life imprisonment into a fixed term of 25 years? Third, was he entitled to the benefit of jail-earned remissions to advance his release date?
What the Court decided and why
A two-judge Bench dismissed the appeal in limine and upheld the High Court’s judgment (para 33).
On the computation of custody, the Court found that the appellant’s methodology artificially inflated his time served. Because the two life sentences were concurrent, the period between his first conviction in February 2015 and his second in September 2017 could not simultaneously be treated as undertrial custody for the later case and post-conviction custody for the earlier one. Sentences granted concurrently operate simultaneously, and the same period of incarceration cannot be notionally counted twice for the purpose of determining completion of the sentence (para 15). The Court added that the assurance fixes the outer limit of imprisonment and it does not permit periods of custody to be counted twice or otherwise contrary to the manner directed by this Court (para 18).
On the nature of the sentence, the Court drew a firm line between judicial power and executive assurance. It held that the 2022 judgment did not convert the appellant’s sentence of life imprisonment into a sentence of 25 years. It merely recognised the sovereign assurance given by the Union Government and directed that, upon completion of 25 years, the Executive would be required to consider the exercise of its powers under Article 72 of the Constitution or Sections 432 and 433 of the CrPC (para 25). The stipulation that he cannot be detained beyond twenty-five years is a consequence of the sovereign assurance extended to Portugal; it does not convert the sentence of life imprisonment into a fixed-term sentence of twenty-five years (para 29).
On jail-earned remissions, the Court held that because the sentence imposed upon him continues to be one of life imprisonment, the appellant cannot claim their benefit to notionally advance his release (para 26). The jail-earned remission cannot be notionally added to the period of incarceration so as to further advance the appellant’s release (para 29). The precedents relied upon by the appellant—Yovehel, V. Sriharan and Swamy Shraddananda—were found misplaced because their factual and legal context did not involve a sovereign assurance given in an extradition context (para 30).
Why it matters
The ruling makes clear that diplomatic promises made to secure a fugitive’s return do not rewrite sentences imposed by Indian courts. A sovereign assurance creates an executive obligation to consider clemency once the stipulated period is reached; it does not, by itself, turn a life sentence into a fixed term. The decision underscores that even where international assurances are given, the judiciary retains the power to impose punishment according to law, and the executive must use its own constitutional or statutory mechanisms to honour its promise.
The judgment also lays down a procedural marker for concurrent sentences: physical custody is a single continuous reality and cannot be split into overlapping categories to claim double credit. By reaffirming the separation of powers between the sentencing court and the remitting executive, the Court balanced India’s commitment to the comity of nations against the gravity of offences that targeted the country’s social and economic stability.